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Article 9

THE ILLINOIS

DREAM AcT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
NIGHTMARE
l. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of immigration rd(mn debates across the countrv, 1
Illinois h~1s enacted an it~dkctivc piece of immigration lcgislatio;1. 2
Illinois Senate Bill 2 HiS, popularly named the Illinois DREAM Act,
muddies the ~1lrcady murky waters surrounding immigration rd(mn. 3
Bill 218S was signed into Illinois law bv Governor Pat Quinn on
August 1, 2011: codifying it as Publi~ Act 97-233. 4 While the
paramount issue surrounding immigration rdl:m11 is citizenship
status, s this Act mandates the creation of an Illinois DREAM Fund
Commission to establish scholarships f()r studcnts,6 create programs
to train high school counselors on how to address "the needs of ...
children of immigrants, "7 and make college tuition s~wings programs
available to anyone. K Yct this legislation is a constitutional nightmare,
and portions of it must be repealed. This Note will outline the
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution pcrpctr~ltcd by this Act so
that the Illinois Legislature on remedy them bd()rC there is an
embarrassing judici~1l mandate, which would expend time, money,
and resources in unnecessary litigation. The Legislature must ensure
that scholarship tlmds arc administered to those who need and
deserve them by a means that docs not violate the United States
Constitution.

I. Sec Sam Youngman, Ob.zm;z l!rj':CS Actil'l:\·t\· to l'rcs.wrc Clmgrns on lmmigr.ltl(JII
Rc!imn, T!IF HILL (Apr. I 9, 2011 ), http://thehill.com/hommcwsjadministDtion/l S6H69' 'bam a-11 rges- activists- t< ,. press 11 re-o lll grcss-< m- im m igra ti< m.
2. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. 97-233 (2011 ).
3. !d
4. S.
21 KS,
'!7th
l;m.
Assemh.
1Ill.
20 II J,
.w.u!:zhlc
;It
http:/ jwww.ilga.g<Jv/kgislation/Bii!Sutus.asp11)ocNum= 21 K5&l;AII)= II & l)ocTypeiD=SB
&Sessi<mii)=X4&GA='l7.
5. .~(·c Peter Nicholas, 0/wn.z {ookJiJg ro Git'<' New !.ik to lmmip;ution Rcfimn,
I .. A.
TLvlES
(JvLlr.
4,
20 I 0),
http://articles.latimes.com/20 I 0/mar/04/nationjb-naimmigr.JtionS- 20 I Omar05.
6. 110 ILL. COM!'. STAT. '!47/67 (2011 ).
7. 105 ILL. OlMI'. STAT. 5/21-2S(e)(5) (2011 ).
X. .~(·c IS ILL. COM!'. STAT. 505/16.5 (2011) (allowing anyone with a \',liid Soci.tl
Securin· numhn or THpavn ldemiticttion Number to he digihk f(n· these programs).
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It is important to note that the Illinois DREAM Act<J should not
be confused with the federal DREAM Act; 10 despite the similarity in
title, these two pieces of legislation arc, in bet, quite ditkrcnt.

The

Federal DREAM Act was, and may be, II an Act with the main
purpose of adjusting the status of illegal immigrant-students who
meet specific critcri~l, thereby allowing them to apply for residency
status.I2 The Illinois Act,I3 however, otters no means to adjust one's
residency status.I4
This Note's primary f(xus will be that of the Illinois DREAM
Act, in particular its creation of the DREAM Fund Commission
through the state IS in violation of the Equal Protection Clause .1 6 The
statute charges the Commission with creating a scholarship giving
specific guidelines on eligibility to receive these scholarships. 17 The
requirements arc that a student must:

<J.
10.
proposed
voted on

Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. <J7-233 (20 II).
Sec DREAM Act of 2011, S. <JS2, !12th Cong. (2011). This is the most recc:nth·
version of the DREAM Act. This version has only been introduced and h:ts nor hem
in either chamber as of February 4, 20 II. /d. The tldl title of the Act is the
lk\'t~lopment, Relict~ and Educ1tion f(H- Alien Minors Act of 20 II, Bill Summary :md Status,
S.
<)52,
!12th
Con g.
(20 II),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquerv/IVd 112: I: ./temp/-hdtiJHf: (i:v(cv(ro l ,&summ2= m& I/home/! .cgisbtiveD:lta.php I
, and would c1llow an individtd who docs not have a legal status in the United States to "cancel
Itheir I remm•:1l . and adjust to the status of an alien lawtidlv admitted t(H· permanent
residence on cl conditional bc1sis" if they meet various requirements, most important!\·, lu\·itlg a
high school diploma or equivalent, S. <JS2, !12th Cong. § 3(h )(I) ( 20 II). The conditional
permanc:nt rcsidc:nt status would bst f(>r six years, during which time they would he eligible ti>r
citizc:nship status. !d. Sponsor Smator Richard Durbin cnvision.s this Acr ,Js giving voung
people an opportunity to contribute to Amcriu, instead of punishing them f(>r being "brought
to the U.S. as children" without any sav in the matter. l'cl.\SJil,!{ rhc J)/UcAAf Acr, DI<K
DURBIN, US SENATOR FOR [I.LI:--.:OIS ASSISTANT MAJORITY LEADER (Feb. 4, 2011 ),
http:/fdu rbi n.scnate. g< >V/pu hi ic/i ndc:x .di11/l1< >t- t< >pies?( :ontent Record_ id = 43eaa I 36-a3de4d72-hcl b-12c300010ae<J. Regardless of the reasons or supporting arguments behind the
proposed Bill, Senator Durbin puts ti>rth a solution and docs so through the proper channels
that have the power, mcc1ns, am! authority to dkctuatc such a policy: Congress. L\UR,\
HUNTER DIFJ'/, ET AI.., 3A AM. )UK. 21l A!J(nl :znd CJ'rizcns § 21\2.
II. Sec DREAM Act of 20 II, S. %2, !12th Con g. (2011 ), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquerv/D?d I 12: I: .ftemp/-bdtiJHf: (a1(ro(cv l .&summ2=m& I/home/! .egislativcl hta.php
(stating that the hill is still in committee).
12. Sec DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3<J<J2, !lith Cong. (2010) (passing the House of
Representatives but stopped bv a filibuster).
13. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. <J7-233 (20 II).
14. Sec 110 [LI.. C0:\11'. STAT. <J47/67 (2011) (nothing in the Act changing citizcm.hip
stcltUS ).
15. Sec id. <J47/67(a) (2011) (creating the Commission).
16. U.S. Col'-:sT. amend. XIV.
17. 110 ILL. CO.'vll'. STAT. <J47f67(b) (2011).
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(I) Have resided with his or her parents or guardian while
attending a public or private high school in I Illinois I·
(2) Have graduated tl-om a public or private high school or received
the equivalent of ~l high school diploma in j Illinois I·
( 3) Ha\T attended school in IIllinois I f(>r at least 3 wars ~1s of the
date he or she graduated tl-om high school or received the
equivalent of a high school diploma.
(4) H~we at least one parent who
States. IX

immigr~lted

to the United

These requirements create a classification based on national
origin, violating the Equal Protection Clause, and, accordingly, must
bee strict scrutiny. 19 The strict scrutiny test requires that a
compelling government interest be served and that the means of
achieving th~lt interest be narrowly tailored to the compelling
interest. 20 This statute hils to serve ~l compelling government interest
and is not narrowly tailored even if such an interest did exist. for
conf1icting with the fourteenth Amendment, this portion of the Act
must be immediately innlidatcd fix being unconstitutional. 2!
This Note will analyze the conf1ict between Illinois Compiled
Statute Chapter 110, Act 947, Section 67-thc portion of the lllinois
DREAM Act creating a scholarship-~md b~1sic principles stated in
the fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Part I
consists of a brief overview of the Equal Protection Clause and its
general applicability. Part II addresses how the Act meets the state
action requirements needed f(>r an equal protection atulysis. This is
done by establishing the appropriate standard of review f(>r this type
of constihttional violation and addressing the classification created,
the government's interest in this legislation, and how tailored the
actions of the legislative body arc in achieving their interest.
following the Part II analysis, the Conclusion will discuss the
problems created by this legislation and how this analysis will afkct
legislation in other jurisdictions, as well as provide a suggested
IX. !d <J47/67(c).
I <J. .~iT Wvgant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (I <JX6) C1pplving strict
scrutinv ;Jmlvsis to "ethnic origin," imerclunging it with "natiotul origin").
20. .~iT Parents Involved in Cmtv. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, SSI U.S. 701, 702
(2007) (citing Adarand Constructor.s, Inc. v. l'ena, SIS U.S. 200 (l<J<JS)) (,micuLning the
strict .scrutim· test).
21. Sec Loving \'. Virginia, 3XX U.S. I, 2 (I 967) (sunm: invalidated f(>r being
incon.si.stcnt with the hntrtcenth Amendment).
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remedy of how the sponsors and co-sponsors of this bill could
establish the proposed scholarship in a way that docs not violate the
Constitution.

II. EQUAL PROTECJ"ION ANALYSIS
The Equal Protection Clause is fi:nmd in section one of the
fourteenth Amendment and states that "In ]o state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " 22
Historically, this allowed f()r separate treatment along class lines as
long as it was cqual, 23 until Brown v. Hoard of" bduc:ztion was
decided, overruling the separate but equal ideology and paving the
way f(:>r the current equal protection analysis. 24 The current analysis
is such that there must be some f(mn of state action 25 seeking to
achieve a goal, by which a classification amongst its people is created.
A subsequent analysis is then done to address the groups being
classified to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
the classification.

A. State Action
The fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
applies to st~ltc action, not "merely private conduct. "2 6 When
"cnf(xccmcnt of a statute, on its t:Kc, I is I racially discriminatory," 27
"compliance with a statute Icommands I a private entity to
discriminatc,"2il or an "agent of the state" acts discrimin~uorily, 2 <J
state action exists. 30 When private actors arc pcrf()rming a public
f\.mction, they arc also deemed to meet the state action

22.
23.

U.S. OlNST. amend. XIV,~ l.
Sec l'kssv v. t'crguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (IH<J6) (allowing separate hut equal
tre:ltment), m·cJTulcd /wBrown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 4H3 (l<J54).
24. 5(·c Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 4X3 (I <J54) (invalidating separate hut equal
tre:ltment).
25. Recent Developments, Clmsrinmim;~/ L1w-Sr:uc Acrion /)rlfJrtiJc !Jwoknl ;~s :1
I~Iinir:uion upon rhc Ruch oF rhc f(Jilrtccnrh Amendment, 25 VA~ll. L. REV. 1237, 1237
( l <J72) ("IT !he Supreme Court has consistently hdd that state action is <l necessary element of
a t(Hirteenth amendment violation").
26. !d.
27. ld at 123H.
28. ld
2<J. !d.
30. ld at l 23<J.
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requirement.'" Additi01ully, courts can find the state acnon
requirement satisfied under a theory of entanglement-where the
private actor is entangled with the state 32-or entwinement-when
the state encourages or has "a symbiotic relationship" with a private
actor. 33

H.

Cb.~:~itications

and 1l1cir Corrcspon(!Ii1g Tests

Once state action has been established, an analysis of the basis of
the cbssification becomes necessary to determine ~onstitutionalitv. 34
The process begins by identifying. the source of the classiticatio;1. 35
These classifications can be manifest in one of three wavs: ( l)
Through a hcially discriminatory statute or policy; 36 (2) Through a
t:Kially neutral, but administratively discriminatory statute; 3 7 or ( 3)
Through a f~Ki~1lly and administratively neutral statute that has a
discriminatory impact coupled with a discriminatory intent. 3H
After establishing the method of discrimination amongst the
cbssitications, the characteristics that distinguish one group from the
other must be scrutinized." 9 Different characteristics require diftcrent

3 I. Recent I kvdopments, supt:znote 25, at I 239.
32. .~(·c Evans v. Newton, 3H2 U.S. 296, 30I (I 966) (the sure's transkr of a p;lrk to a
priV;lte trustee while the p;lrk was still being mainuined bv the state entangled the state
sufticientl\· to meet the state action requirement).
33. Sec Brentwood Acad. v·. Tcnn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 53 I U.S. 2HH, 305
(200I) (Thonus, )., dissmting) (explaining mtwinemcnt: "a private organiz;ltion's acts ..
constitute state ;lction . . when the organization ... created, coerced, or I is I eneouraged by
the government; or acted in ;l symbiotic relationship with the government.").
34. Sec Jmnikr A. LltT.lbel', "J)WH (lJrit·inp. While H!:zck)".znd hpt;z/l'rotccttim: Jhc
Re;z/ities o{;zn Unconstitutionzfl'olice l'rxticc, 6 ).L. & POI'Y 2<JI, 306 (1997) (illustrating
how ;liter state ;Ktion is established, classification must be addressed).
35. Sec Bowen v. Gilliard, 4H3 U.S. 587,602 (I<J87) (emphasizing the need to identify
the class being "disadvantaged" bd(n-c atuly~eing it).
36. Sec Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. I<JO (I<J76) (illustrating a statute th;lt is EKi.1llv
discrimin;ltorv: "prohibiting the sale of ... beer to males under the age of 2 I and to ti:maks
under the ;lge of 18").
37 . .~(·eYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,362 (1886) (showing that, while licmsing
is ;ln example of a bciallv neutral law, rejecting only Chinese applicants demonstrates
"discriminations in the administr;ltion of the ordinance").
38. .~(xWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,230 (I<J76) (showing that police exam was
acceptable despite h,wing a discriminatory imp;Kt (blacks did worse than whites on the exam)
becll!se the exam was bcially neutLll, ;ldministered in a neutral wav, and did not have an
intentional discriminatory impact).
39. Sec Unitl'd Sutes v. C:arokne !'rods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, I S3 n.4 ( 1938) (stating
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities mav be a special condition, which tends
seriouslv ro curtail the opcr;ltion of those politic1l processes ordinarilv to be relied upon to
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levels of protection, with the degree of protection contingent upon
the ability of the class or group to protect itself politically or the
biological differences inherent in those characteristics. 40 The
classifications arc as f()llows: suspect classifications, quasi-suspect
classifications, and all other classifications. A classification based on a
suspect classification,41 or ftmdamcntal right, 42 requires the
application of a strict scrutiny tcst. 43 The courts have articulated that
these classifications arc "in most instances irrelevant to anv
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose " 44 and must be
"narrowly tailored to ftirthcr a compelling governmental interest. " 45
If a classification is drawn based upon gender, a quasi-suspect class,
the method crc<lting the classification is subject to intermediate
scrutiny. 46 This requires that an important government interest must
exist, and the method of achieving that interest must be substantially
related to that intcrcst.4 7 The justification t(x this lower level of
scrutiny is that courts have recognized that biological differences exist
between the genders that would support sex-based classifications. 4H
All other classifications, such as those based on "age, socioeconomic
status, and mental disability arc subject to rational basis review. " 4<J
Rational basis review requires that these non-suspect classifications

protect minorities, and which may call t<>r a correspondingly more searching judicial inquin·"
and thereby est<lblishing that different classitications need to be <lll(micd diHcTent levels of
protection).
40. ,kc Marcv Strau", Rccv;i/wtil~l'; Suspect CI:J.\siliutions, 35 SEJ\TJTE LJ. I .. REV.
135, 13<J (20 II) ("IS lome courts ,\IT exclusively concerned wirh the 'discrete and imui<lr'
nature of the group, others t(JCus on immut<lbility of the group's characteristics, and still others
.1re mostly concerned with the group\ history of discrimination" when .1ddre"ing wlur level of
scrutinv to .1pplv).
41. ,~(·c San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 105 (I<J73)
(identit\·ing race, nationalirv, <llld aliemge as suspect cla"iticarions).
42. ld at I (staring rhar tlmdamental rights require,\ compelling interest).
4::l. ,~(·c Plyler \'. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (I<JS2) (staring that suspect classes and
tlmdamental rights need to be precisely tailored to,\ compelling government interest -the .strict
scrutim· rest).
44. Acbrand Consrructor.s, Inc. v.l'cna, 515 U.S. 200,216 (I<J<J5).
45. Shaw v. Reno, SO<J U.S. 6JO, 6::l I (I <J<J3 ).
46. .~(·c United States v. Virginia, 5IH lJ .S. 515, 571 (I <J<J6) ("I W le evaluate a
staturorv cbssitication based on sex under ... 'intermediate scrutinv'").
47. Jd
4H. ,~(·c Nguven v. lmmi!',r<ltion & NaturaliL<ltion Serv., 5::l3 U.S. 53 (2001) (allowing
gender classiticarions beuusc of biological dittcrcnces between male.s .md knules; a kmale is
guaranteed to know about her child due ro rhe bet rhat she will give birth to the child, while
the Lither ma\' not even know he has a child).
4<J. Strauss, Sllf'l~l note 40, at 146.
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serve ~1 legitimate government interest and be rationally related to
that interest. 5 Classifications based on rational basis arc rardv
overturned, S1 while classifications subject to strict scrutiny ~1rc ustDlly
"strict in theory, but f:1tal in f:Kt,"S 2 making identification of the
classification increasingly important in determining the outcome of
an equal protection analysis. 53

°

Ill. TilE ILLINOIS DREAM ACT: EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

A.

11/inoi~·' State

Action

Illinois Smatc Bill 2 I 85 was introduced bv Senator John
Culkrton on february 2, 20 ll. S4 The Bill was pass~d by the Illinois
Senate on May 4, 20 ll by a vote of forty-five to ckvm. ss The I louse
of Representatives on May 30, 20 ll approved the Bill in a vote of
sixty-one to fitty-thrccY1 The Bill was signed into law by Governor
Quinn on August l, 20 ll. S7 The moment the Bill was signed into
law, the eligibility requirements t(Jr the scholarship limiting
participation to certain individualsSR became codified ~md
enf()rceablc, meeting the state action requirement f(:>r an equal
protection ~malysis. S<J
Alternatively, if state action is not established from mere
codification, then the DREAM fund Commission's actions would
meet the state action requirement under a public function theory. 60

SO. Cin· of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,432 ( l<JRS).
C:hc1b M. Patterson, Ttj>s thr the J)uc l'rocc.1s Cinl Rt~htl Cm:, l'RM:. Li\IV 7
(Dec. I'!'!6).
S2. htllilove v. Klut~enick, 44R U.S. 44R, Sl<J (l<JROJ (l'owcll, )., concurring) (citing
Regcnrs ofUniv. ofC1Iif. v. Bakke, 43R U.S. 26S, 362 ( 1'!7RJ).
S3. !d. (urili~eing the "Elul in t:Kt" phrc1sing to illustrate how strict scrutiny amlvsis arc
usuc11lv not 0\Trcomc).
S4. S.
21 RS,
'!7th
Gen.
Assemb.
(Ill.
20 II),
hrrp:/ jwww.ilga.g<>v/kgislarion/BiiiSurus.asp)] )<>cNum=21 RS&l;AJI )=II &D<>cTvpeJ])= SB
&Session]])= R4&GA ='!7.
SS. Jd
S6. Jd
57. Jd
SR. S(·c 110 ILL. CoM!'. Sri\T. <J47/67(c) (2011) (establishing sranLbrds t<>r who is
eligible to applv l(>r the schobrship cmd who is not).
S<J . .~(·c Adickes v. S. H. Kn:ss & Co., 3<JR U.S. 144, 152 (1'!70) (suring tlut state
otlicial\ involvement in a conspircKy provides state action).
60. .~(·c Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 41 '! lJ .S. 34S, 3S2 (1974) ("\ S [tate cKtion Ican
be 1 prcsem in the exercise bv a private emity of powers traditionallv cxclusivelv reserved to rhe
stare"); 110 ILL. Cnvll'. STAT. 947j67(b) (2011) (outlining rhc Commission\ duties).
S I.
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The public function theory requires that a "function performed I by a
public entity be I exclusively and traditionally public" in order to
impart state action.61 In K1icgcr v. Tr;wc Compa1~v, the court
indicated that a particular board was "entrusted with what has
traditionally been a public function: coordinating the educational
policy and programs .... " 62 The court articulated that the board W<lS
doing more than administering over t:Kulty at a single university and
instead was involved in the "implementation of city-wide cduotional
policy"-a public fimction.63
While awarding a scholarship is not a public tlmction, 64 the
DREAM fund Commission's other duties, such as "establishing and
administering training programs f(Jr high school counselors and
counselors, admissions otliccrs, and financial aid officers of public
institutions of higher education," arc actions pcrf(mncd by the
government or statc.65 While training programs can be private or
public tlmctions, the establishing of requirements and standards f(>r
public and government employees to participate in specific trainings
goes beyond mere public training programs and rises to the level of
administration within a state's educational system to become a public
function, as in K1icgn: 66 By performing these duties, the
Commission steps into the shoes of the statc67 and the
administr<ltion of this scholarship becomes action attributable to the
state.
In addition to a public function theory, the actions of the
Commission could also be considered state action by means of the
entanglement thcory. 61l By mandating specific methods f(>r
scholarship eligibility, 69 raismg moncy,70 establishing specific
61. Brmtwood Acad. v. Tmn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 21-lX, 302
(2001).
62. Sec Krieger v. Tr,mc Co., 765 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. D.C. I<J<JI ).
63. !d. at 761.
64. ](,!' f(} 7lj>s fin· h/J;wciz! Aid, FASTWEB (Apr. 21, 200<J),
http: j /www. bstweb.n lll1/fi nancial-aid/articlcs/3 54-t< >p- I0- tips- t( >r-financial -aid.
65. 110 ILL. COM I'. STAT. <J47/67(h) (20 II).
66. Kn(gCJ; 765 F. Supp. at 760.
67. Sec Bmton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (U.S. I<J61)
(articulating how pri\·atc action imputed state action: "By its inaction, the Authoritv, and
through it the State, has not only made itself ,l party to the rdi1sc~l of service, but h,ls
f discriminated[").
6X. Evans v. Newton, 3X2 U.S. 2<J6 (I <)66 ).
6<J. I 10 III. COM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (201 1).
70. ld <J47j67(b)(2).

lj
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programs, 71 and operating methods and goals, 72 the state, \Vhile
selecting "private individuals"73 to operate the Commission,/4
becomes entangled with the Commission such that the Commission's
actions arc essentially those of the state, and thcrd(>rc state <KtionJ:'l
In essence, the state is behind the scenes pulling the strings, and
when the Commission acts and selects specific groups of people t(>r
the schobrship,/6 it is <ls though the state is selecting them. Also,
under an cntwinement theory, state action will be t(nmd where
conduct that is t(>rmally "private" becomes so intertwined with
government<ll policies or so impregnated with government character
that the conduct becomes subject to the constitutional limitations
placed upon state action .... In deciding the question whether state
action existed, the court set out a three fKtor analysis:
( 1) to what extent the business is subjected to state regulations.
However, the court asserted that the mere bet that a business is
subject to state regulations docs not by itself convert its actions into
that of the state t(>r purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) The sufficiency of a close nexus between the state and the
clullcngcd action of the regulatory entity, so that the action of the
cntitv may be hirly treated as that of the state itself;
( 3) Whether the private decision involves such coercive power or
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, bv the state that
thLc choice must in law be deemed that of the state. 71

This statute presents the three necessary EKtors t(>r cntwinement:
state regulation, a close nexus between the state and the action
challenged, and encouragement by the state in taking action.
In the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the state regulates the
DREAM fund Commission by requiring that a separate government
organization-the
Illinois
Student
Assistance
Commission

71. !d. 'J47/67(b)(7).
72. !d. <)47/67.
73. .~(·c entwinement '1rgument in proceeding paragraph.
74. 110 III.. Cnvll'. STAT. <J47/67(a) (2011) ("The Governor shall appoint with the
ad\·ice and consem of the Senate, members to the Illinois DREAM Fund ( :ommission.").
7S. Sec Marsh v. Abbama, 326 U.S. :'lOI, S06 (1<)46) (illustrating how mmp'lll\' th.u
operates town is imputed with st.lte action on its propcrtv when trying to make exclusions).
76. Sec 110 ILL. CoM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (2011) (giving criteria t<>r how the
Commission will select recipients).
77. llawkins v. Nat'\ Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602,606 (C.D. Ill. I<JR7)
(citation ,llld imenuiL]Uotation marks omitted).
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("ISAC")-participatc in the scholarship program7X and sets specific
guidelines on how the Commission is opcratcd?9 The nexus between
the Commission and the state is so close that the members of the
Commission arc chosen by the Governor of the state. xo Lastly, the
state goes a step beyond encouragement by creating the Commission
via statute and charging them with the duties therein. X1
Ultimately, the state cannot avoid state action, and thereby an
equal protection violation, by merely substituting private actors in
the state's place. X2 The state attempts to do this through the usc of
two separate methods: appointing private actors to operate the
CommissionX3 and insisting that the hmds t<>r the scholarship be
entirely operated from private donations. X4 The Supreme Court,
however, has stated that when a city "remains entwined in the
management or control Iof something], it remains subject to the
restraints of the fourteenth Amcndmcnt."X5 I Icrc the State is
maintaining control of the Commission by establishing guidelines
within the Statutc,X6 controlling membership of the Commission,X7
and having another state organization maintain the tlmding. xx
Additionally, the state is appointing individuals to the Commission,
all t()r the purpose of carrying out the discriminatory policies of the
scholarship, satisfying the cntwincmcnt theory, and, again, making
7X. Sec 1!0 ILL. C<Hvll'. STAT. 947j67(d) (2011) (requiring Illinois Studcm Assistance
Commission to create a fund to provide scholarships 1(lr the Commission).
79. Si·c 1d 947/67 (giving guidelines to the Commission f(lr required dutic.s).
XO. .S(·c 1d 947j67(a) (charging the Illinois (;overnor with the dutv of selecting
cc>n1n1issi< >IKrs).

Xl. fd (requiring the Illinois Studellt Assistance Commission to create the lllinoi.s
DREAM hmd Commission).
X2. .~(·c Evans v. Newton, 3X2 U.S. 296, 299 ( l 966) (citing Terry v. Adams 345 U.S.
461 (I 953)) ("I W !here a State delegates an aspect of the elective process to private groups,
thcv become subject to the same restraims as the St.ltc. That is to s.1y, when private individuals
or groups arc endowed bv the State with powers or tlmctiom govcrnmemal in n.1tun:, thn·
become agencies or instrumcmalities of the State and su hject to its constitutional limitatiom." 1
(cit.ltion omitted and emphasis added).
X3. l !0 ILL. CO/vll'. STAT. 947/67(a) (2011 ).
X4. S(·c 1d 947/67(d) ("The Illinois DREAM fund shall he timdcd cmirch· from
private comri hutions").
X5. t'1·:ms, 3X2 U.S. at 30 l.
X6. .kc 1d 947/67. Statutes can be modified, amciKkd, or rescinded :llld therct(m·
subject to the comrol of the legislature.
X7. Sec 1d 947/67(a) (illustrating that the Illinois Covcrnor controls who become.s ,\
member of the Commission).
XX. .Si:c id. 947j67(d) (requiring !SAC, a st.ltc org.mi£atiuii, to control the
<:<>n1n1ission\ funding).
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state action attributable to the Commission.X'J
Additional

control

can

be shown

through

the usc of state

funding. Not only has the state solicited private ftmds,<JO but the
statute's play on words to fund the scholarship with printc tlmding
is a legislative sleight of handY 1 The statute only stipulates and
nundatcs that the funds generating money for the scho/;u:~lnps be
from private timdingY 2 This allows state money and
resources')~ to be uscd,'J 4 which has already occurred, in the

~lttaincd

furtherance of this discriminatory scholarship.% Despite the state's
attempt to circumvent state action through the usc of private funds,%
public tlmds arc being uscd,'J7 and, again, through a theory of
cntwincmcnt, st~ltc action can be f(mnd, requiring application of an
equal protection analysisYX
State action must be t(mnd in the application of the Illinois
DREAM Act; to not do so would allow the state to carry out
discriminatory ~1gcncbs, dtcctivdy destroying equal protcction99 and
allowing

legislative

bodies

to

enact discrimin~ltory statutes

and

WJ. Sec F1 ;~m, ~X2 U.S. at ~()I (tramtl-rring of p.1rk to pri\'.lte trustee did not JTmm·e
sute action).
90. .~(·c 1/!J/un; !>RtAA1 !let, [III:-.JOIS STUDE:-.JT ASSISTA;o.;CF OJ:\11-.!ISSIO;o.; (2012),
http:/ jwww .collcgcillinois.c>rg/illinc>is-dream-actjindcx.html (shc>wing that lllin<>is' rcsoun:cs
and monev arc being utilized hv having the Covcrnor and state involved, milizing the validitv
of the st.ltc\ reputation l(H· a purely private scholarship, and using statc-timdcd and -operated
wchsitcs l(>r :ldvcrtising .md soliciting l(>r Commission members, donations, and the
progr.1n1.).

91. S(:c l 10 11.1 .. COM!'. SlAT. 947/67(d) (2011) ("The.. Fund shall he timdcd
cntirclv from priv.nc contributions").
92. .~(·c id. (requiring that a fund he established to provide scho/.u:;hips and th:lt the
fund he mtirclv ti·om priv:ltc contributions, thcrd(>tT requiring that onlv the scholarship
monev he privarclv funded).
9~ . .~(·c id. 947j67(h)(2) (noting that the statlltc\ cst.Jblishment of:\ not-l(>r-protit
entirv to raise tlmd.s t(>r the :ldministr:ltion of the section makes 110 rdi.:rencc to those timds
being private nor limits its timding to a private source).
<J4. .~(·c 1d. 947j67(a) (requiring !SAC to set up:\ fund t(>r the Commission).
<JS. Sec
Appm/mncnt;·,
STATF
01'
III.I;o.;OIS,
http:/ /appointments.illinois.govj:lppointmentsDct:lil.din?id=4 I 7 (last visited Oct. X, 20 II)
(showing that Illinois' resources and money have been used to ti~rther the progr.1m hv hosting
.1pplications on the state\ servers, pav l(H· someone to publish the posting, and maintain the
wehpage).
%. 110 11.1 .. CoM!'. STAT. 947/67(d) (201 I).
97. Appointment;, supr:1note <JS.
9X . .kc Ev:1ns \'.Newton, 3X2 U.S. 296, ~02 (1966) (amlogizing the tr.mskr of the
park in FJ',Jfls to the transkr of the program and scholarship to the Commission).
99. .~(·c Recent lkvdopmems, supr:Jnote 2S (staring that st:1tc .1etion is required t<>r :111
e<jll.ll protection :malv.sis).
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policies by means of third parties to circumvent ~md avoid the st~ltc
action requirement f()r equal protection analysis.IOO The state's
establishment of discriminatory guidelines and selection of trustees to
act on its behalf in applying these guidclincsiOI arc the reasons why
the courts have articulated the theories of cntanglemcnt 102 and
cntwincmcnt 103 and whv state action should be f(mnd.
Whether state action is f()Und from the Bill's codification or
under an alternative theory, sutlicicnt state action exists to give rise to
an equal protection analysis. The state's role as puppet-master in the
manipulation of this act mandates the application of the federal
Constihltion to overcome this injustice. Accordingly, the fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies.

B. Method o{Discnininztion
Continuing with the equal protection analysis, after state action
has been met, the application or method that creates the
discriminatory policy must be addrcsscd. 104 Here the statute bcially
creates the classification advancing the equal protection analysis. 1os
However, if the statute were f(mnd to be t:Kially neutral, it would
still be discriminatory in its effect because of its intent and results.
A classification is deemed to be bcially discriminatory when the
discrimination can be t(nmd in the plain language of the statutc. 106
In the Act bctc)rc us, one of the requirements is that a recipient must
"have at least one parent who immigrated to the U nitcd States." I07
The groups created arc a class of children who have one parent that
immigrated to the United States and a class of children whose
parents did not immigrate to the U nitcd States, IOil thus creating the

100. !d.
101. 5ix 110 !1.1 .. O>MI'. STAT. <J47/67(a) (2011) (authorizing a stare actor, the
GmTrnor, ro selLer rhe commissioners, who, in turn, select the scholarship recipients).
I02. Fvans, 3H2 U.S. 2<J6.
I03. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 2HX (200 I).
I04. Miller v. johnson, 5I5 U.S. <JOO, <JOS (I <J<JS) (illustrating that eqtul protection
applies to laws that arc both t:Kiallv discriminatory and bcially ncutrctl with discriminator\'
impact).
105. Sec l'lessv v. ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 53H (IX<J6), overruled lw Brown\'. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 4X3 (I <)54) (stating that a law me1king it illegal ti>r people to not sit in se.tts
other tlun those assigned to them based on their race is bcially discriminCJtorv).
I 06. !d.
107. 110 ILL. CO,Yll'. STAr. 'J47j67(c)(3) (2011 ).
I OX. !d.
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classification in the bnguagc of the Bill. Therefore, the statute will be
deemed bcially discriminatory t<>r purposes of an equal protection
analvsis. 109
Should a f:1eially discriminatory argument be unsuccessful and the
statute t(nmd bcially neutral, the equal protection analysis is still
proper under a discriminatory application thcory.ll o The
Commission is required by law to select individuals t<>r scholarships
based on the given criteri~1 of the statute. Ill By carrying out its
duties, the Commission will only be able to award the scholarship to
those who have at least one parent that immigrated to the United
States. 112 This would have the same dlcct and outcome as the f1eiallv
discrimin~ltory argument, again, advancing the equal protection
an~1lvsis. 11 -'

In the event that neither of these theories is succcsstlli, a third
theory exists where the statute is bcially neutral and neutrally applied
but produces discriminatory results coupled with a discrimin~1tory
intcnt.ll4 Proving this theory requires the same scenario used under
the previous theory, in which there arc discriminatory results t(>r the
recipients of the scholarship, but not because of the selection process.
If these results occur, looking at the legislative debate bd(>rc the Act
was passed can satisfy the discriminatory intent prong. 11 S Senator
Culkrton, who sponsored ~md submitted the bill, 116 indicated that
the intent of the Bill was to make available to non-citizcn individuals
"the same programs that the citizens can avail themselves of right
nmv,"ll7 suggesting that the t(>Cus of this Bill was to aid non-citizcn
individuals. Additionally, Senator Johnson emphasized the purpose
of the Bill as being for "childrcn of immigr~mts who came here

109. .~(·c 1d 947/67(c) (creating other classifications; however, f(>r the purposes of this
Note, Subsection (c)(4) is the relevant dassitiution).
ll 0. ;'v/Illo; Sl S U.S. 900.
Ill. llO ILL. C:OMI'. STilT. 947/67(c)(3) (2011).
112. /d (requiring the Commission to t(,llow the guidelines in the statute).
113. Afi!!CJ; 51 S U.S. 900.
114. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
liS. Marrin ). O'Hara, Is IrA Chine to rive in PuNic !lousing? !l l'ropm.II to the
/1/inoi;· Gcncr;I/ Asscmhh· to Amend the Autonutic Tumkr St.Itutc, 27 j. MARS I L\l.L L. RE\'.
XSS, X76 ( l 994 ).
116. S.
2lXS,
97th
(;en.
Assemb.
(IlL
2011 ),
,li;Iif,Ihk
;It
http://www.ilga.gov/lcgisbtion/Bi!IStatus.asp?DocNum= 21 XS&c;AJI)= II &D<>cTvpell )= SB
&Scssion1D=X4&C;A=97 (noting that Senator C:ullerton sponsored the Bill)
117. S. liLOOR DFB/\TF, 97th IlL (;en. Assemb., (;en. Scss. 23 (Mc1y 4, 20 I I).

188

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOUHNAL

[2013

probably not by their own choice, but because . . . of their
parcnts." 1IH This furthers the non-citizen contention, 119 emphasizing
the intent of the Bill to be f(x children of immigr~mts and not nonimmigrants.120 Senator Delgado also indicated that the fcxus of the
Bill was to specifically aid those that "don't enjoy the ... status of
citizcnship." 121 While Senator Delgado did not emphasize the
children-of-immigrants aspect, he still stressed a discriminatory intent
fc:>r the Bill to apply to either non-citizens or children of immigrants
and not others. The discussions during the floor debate did not argue
against this framework and instead consisted of verbal support f(x
the Bill. 122 While senators may vote on a bill f(x ditlcrcnt reasons,
the unifcxmity of the comments that arose and the lack of
contradiction indicate that distinguishing between immigrants and
non-immigrants was at least one view of the Bill's intended
purpose.I23

C Classifications Created
Under an equal protection analysis, the classification used by the
state determines what test should be applied in order to determine if
the classification is constitutional or unconstitutionaJ.124 Courts must
look at the impact of a statute, as well as the wording of the statute
itself~ in identifying along what lines classifications arc being
drawn. 12 5 This particular Act creates classifications based on
alicnagc126 or, alternatively, national origin.127
11H. !d.
119. !d.
120. ld at 26.
121. !d. clt 2H.
122. Sec H.R. f.:LOOR DEBATE, 97th Ill. (;en. Assemb., Gm. Se,s. 17'J (Mav 30, 2011)
(emphasizing that the Illinois House of Representative' comments mirrored those of the
Senate through the House sponsor Representative Acevedo's response to "[ (:[an anv student
applv t(H· this . scholarship?" being "[ U[ndocumented, yes," as well a.s Representative
Mulligan's statement regarding immigrants: "it would be to educate the be't and tl1<: brightest
to go on, particularh· to help their hmilies and mavbc be the first person that\ gone to
college ... ").
123. Sec 1d (noting that no one spoke in opposition to the Bill).
124. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) ("[T[hc Court has c\·olved more
th,m one test, depending upon the interest aHccted or the classification involved").
125. Sec Mcm'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) ("In determining
whether the challenged ... provision violates the Equal Protection CLHhC, we must fir.st
determine what burden of justific1tion the cbssitiution created").
126. I 10 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 947/67(c) (201 I) (I(>Cusing on the citizcnship implications
associcltcd with the statute\ usc of the word immigrants).
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1. Alienage
The way the statute is phrased, stating that that the scholarship is
eligible for people who have a "parent who immigrated to the United
States," 12 ~'~ draws a divide based on alienage.I2<J Black's Lnv
Dictionary defines alietuge as "the condition or state of an alien ""' 0
~md an alien as "a foreigner; one born abroad; a person resident in
one country, but owing allegiance to another." 1-' 1 Additionally,
federal legislation has articulated a statutory ddinition of an alien as
'\1ny person not a citizen or national of the United St~ltes." I-'2 These
ddinitions articulate the characteristics necessary fiJr a classification
b~1sed on alienage. for this Act, the parent of the individual must
have been an ~1lien (someone born abroad) who came to the United
States'-'-' in order for the individual to be eligible to receive the
scholarship.I34
Looking at the floor debates results in the same interpretation f(x
the purposes of articulating the basis of the classification as being
grounded along alienage lines. Throughout the tloor debates, in both
the Illinois House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate, it w~ls
repeated and emphasized that the Act was going to aid the children
of illegal immigr~mts and to give undocumented children a chance to
further their educations by making funding available to allow them
to attend higher education bcilities. 135 These expressions indicate
that the intention of the Act is to create a classification between
citizens and non-citizens or, put into the equ~1l protection fr~m1ework,
a classification based on alienagc.I36

127. !d. (requiring parents' immigration creates anation:ll origin requirement).
121-1. !d.
12<J. !d.
130. A/im:l!{<"
/)cfinitJ(}/],
BJ.M K'S
LAW
DICTIO:O:AKY,
http://bbcksl.nnliction:m·.or)!;/alim:lge/ (last \'is ired Nov. 24, 20 II).
131. A lim f)cfinition, BLACK'S L\ W DICT!Ol'\i\K Y, http://bbcksl:nvdiction:lr\'.or)!;/alicnn/ (l:tst \'isin:d Nov. 24, 2011).
132 SecK U.S.C. § 1101 (2011).
133 110 II.!.. Cn\11'. ST,\T. <J47/67(c)(4) (2011 ).
134. !d. <J47/67(c).
135. .~(·c H.R. t:J.OOK DE!li\TE, sup1:1notc 122.
136. SiT Espinm:l v. F:lrah Mtg. Co., 414 U.S. X6 ( l<J73) (st.lting that cbssitic:ltions
b:1sed on citizenship arc discriminations based on alienage), Sllf'<'J:I'C<kd lw st.ltlltc on other
p.row1<l1 :1.1 .lt.ltu! in ( :orrcz:ulo v. S.liin Bank & Trust Co., 6XO t-:.3d <J36 (7th ( :ir. 20 II).
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While the statute docs not explicitly state that the dividing lines
arc based on alienage, this is not a rcquircment. 13 7 If that were the
case, legislative and government bodies could avoid

fourteenth

Amendment scrutiny by not using wording that directly identifies
one of the classifications.13X This statute's classification is based on a
parent's alienage, rather than the alienage of the actual recipient, but
this distinction is immatcriaJ. 139 The statute on its f:Ke is classif)·ing
someone based on the recipient's parent's classification and this
generational removal is still a classification based on alicnage.140
Classifications based on alienage arc typically subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis.14l Exceptions exist that have allowed for a less strict
analysis

when

alienage

is

a

relevant

trait.142 The

courts

have

articulated that when dealing with an interest in the dcmocr<ltic
process, such as voting, 143 clections, 144 certain public otliccs, 14 S
police oHiccrs, 146 and primary or secondary education teaching
positions, 14 7 one's citizenship stahls aHccts one's ability to carry out
those roles and thus becomes rclcvant. 14X The Illinois DREAM Act,
however, is not atlcctcd by such an applie<ltion of the classification
because receiving a scholarship is not "intimately related to the

137. S(·c Lewis v. Ascension ]',1rish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 3S3 (Sth Cir. 2011) (Jones,
]., concurring) ("What matters is the government\ inrcntionalusc ofraei<ll classification").
13X. Sec Scmlc Sch. Dist. No. I v·. Washington, 633 F.2d 133X, 1344 (9th Cir. I 9XO)
("Though Initiative 350 creates the differential classification indirectly hv omission, there is no
basis f(lr distinguishing it as a matter of law from ... explicit
classiticatiom ").
139 . .S{·cSt. Francis Cull. v. AI-Khazraji, 4XI U.S. 604,613 (19X7) ("Congre." intended
to protect ti·om discrimin,ltion identifiable cbsses of persons who arc subject to intentional
discrimination solch· because of their ancestry").
140. .kc l'lcssv v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 ( IX<J6) (indicating that a law during the
scp<lratc hut equal era applied to an individual who was one-eighth black, much like thi.s law,
which grants schobrship cligihilitv as lung as an indiv·idml is at least a qu.lrter-immigr.mt).
141. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 2 I') (I 9X4) ("[A [ sutc law tlut discriminates on
rhc b.1sis of .dimage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutinv."J.
I42. !d. at 224 (recognizing citizenship status as being a bctor t(H· democratic sclt~
gov·crnmcnt roles .md »ituations).
143. Id (timctioning that is deemed political not held to strict scrutinv).
144. !d. (t(lllowing that electable positions would also flll into this categorY).
14S. Id (im·olving those with the "dav-to-d.1y timctioning of »tate government" but not
nourics).
146. Foln· v. Conndic, 43S U.S. 29 I ( 197X ).
147. (;regorv A. Scopino, A C()f)stitutionJ! Oddin· oF Almost HJ';C<IIIt!i1<· 0Jmplnin':
An:z/1 ';CJi1g the f:!ficimcr· oF the !'olitiul Function Doctrine, ')() CORNELl. L. REV. I 377, 1379
(200S) (listing teachers omd scvcr;ll other l''"itions as .1lso blling within this exception).
14X. Bernal v·. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 2 I') (I 9X4 ).
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process of democratic self-govcrnmcnt."l4°
furthermore, alienage classifications preventing aliens from
receiving in-state tuition luvc bcm struck down in the past. ISO While
the Supreme Court has stated that "undocumented aliens" arc not
themselves a suspect classification, 1S1 the wording of the Act allows
t(>r documented and undocumented aliens to receive this
scholarship, 152 thus preventing that tl·om affecting the classifiotion
or which test to apply.

2. Nationzl origin
In the alternative, the Act also classifies applicants along lines of
national origin. N a tiona) origin classifications, instead of t<xusing on
citizenship status like alimagc, 153 f(Kus on "the country from which
you or your f(>rcbc~lrs came. "1 54 Classifications "I distinguishing I
between citizens solely because of their ancestry Iis I odious to a free
people whose institutions arc t(mndcd upon the doctrine of
equality, "1 ss and the Act classifies directly along those lines.
The Illinois DREAM Act's language requiring tlut ~m individual
"have a parent who immigrated to the United Statcs"l5 6 expressly
inquires into one's ancestry to determine if one meets this
requirement ~md is therd(HT eligible f(>r this scholarship.lS7 This type
of inquiry and classification of individuals "implicates the s~m1C grave
concerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name. "ISS

140. .~l.·c id. ,\t 216 ("iTihe standard of review is lowered when evaluating the validirv of
exclusions that entrust only to citizens important elective and non-elective positions whose
operations go to the heart of representative government.").
ISO. Toll v. Moreno, 4SX U.S. 1, 010 (10X2) (striking down the discrimineltorv policv
belsed on the Supremacy Clause and not the Equal Protection Clause).
151. Ph·lcr \'. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (I 0S2 ).
152. Sec 110 11.1 .. C:OMI'. STAT. 047/67(c) (2011) (allowing an illegal alim with ell\
immigram parent to be eligible ti>r the scholarship ,llso allows a United Sutcs-born child with
ell\ immigram parent to be eligible ti>r the scholarship).
153. Sec Espinoza v. 1-'arah Mtg. Co., 414 U.S. S6 (1073) (stelting that classifications
based on citizenship arc discriminations based on alienage), supcJ:1nlcd lw sr;~turc on orhcr
!'mund1 as sr;~rcd 1i1 ( :orrczano v. S,llin Bank & Trust ( :o., 6SO !-'.3d 036 (7th Cir. 2011 ).
154. !d. at S0 (quoting the definition of national origin).
155. Regents ofUniv. ofC1lif v. Bakke, 43X U.S. 265,204 (1078) (quoting l.m·ing v.
Virginia, 3SS U.S. I (1067)).
156. 110 !1.1.. COMI'. STAT. 047/67(c)(4) (2011 ).
157. !d
1SX. Rice v. C1yctano, 52X U.S. 405, 406 (2000) (discussing ancestry as a classification
relevant to the fourteenth Amendment, although decided on 1-'itin:mh Amcndmellt grounds).
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This has the effect of using the national origin of one's parents to
determine one's eligibility. If both parents' national origin is that of
the United States, the individual is not eligible f(Jr the scholarship. 15 <J
An unpublished federal case from the District Court of New
Jersey addressed the national origin relationship by stating that the
national origin of an individual "born in the United States is
determined by looking only to his anccstry." 160 This articulation
dispels the possibility of the state contending that the Act is not a
national origin case by arguing that the Act docs not address the
individual's national origin, but instead f(>euscs on parcntagc.I 6 1
Even if such an argument is accepted, the parentage here only applies
because the applicant is looking to his parent's national origin; it
docs not f(>eus on his relationship to his parcnts.I62 This creates a
chain where, even if the classification is drawn along parentage lines,
the ultimate classification still rests on the national origin roots of the
parents. To allow the state to overcome a national ongm
classitlcation by simply removing the classification by a matter of
generations, or degree of separation, would permit classifications
based on one's race to be enf()rccablc as long as states phrase
legislation to depend on one's past generations, 163 which again, the
courts have not allowed. 1M
The most important case in establishing an equal protection
analysis f()r a classification based on national origin is Korcmatm v.
United Statcs. 165 In Korcmatm, a curfew-relocation order was
enacted t()r people of Japanese ancestry, barring them from leaving
their houses during certain hours, much as the Illinois DREAM Act
is a scholarship-eligibility bar against those whose ancestry docs not

IS<J. 110 [!.I.. OlMI'. STXI'. <J47/67(c)(4) (2011) (requiring a parent to have immigrated
to the United States).
160. Sec English v. Misvs lnt'l Banking Svs., Inc., 2005 WL 17031 <J<J, at *6 (D.N .J. Julv
20, 2005 ).
161. 110 l!.L. COM!'. STAT. <J47/67(c) (2011) (hypothetically arguing th.lt the plain
languc1ge revolves around a pclrental relationship).
162. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. S3 (200 I) (discussing
pan:ntage as the t(mll of the relationship to the parent, the issue in this case being cliphilitv f(Jr
citi1xnship status because the Lither wc1s cl U.S. citizen).
163. .~<·e Christine B. Hickman, The nenl and the One J)rop Rule: Rau;zJ Cmgon(·s,
Afi-icznilmericws, :If}(! the U.S. Cemus, <J5 MJ(:JI. L. RFV. 1161, 117H (l<J<J7) (discussing the
implications of defining blacks in certain parts of the United States as "anvone who was one·
sixtemth Black" and being subject to discrimincltion).
164. Rice v. Cayetano, 52K U.S. 4<J5, 4<J6 (2000).
16S. Korematsu v. United States, 323U.S. 214 (l<J44).
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go outside the borders of the United Statcs.166 Ironically,
Korcmatsu, who was subject to internment because of his parent's
national origin, 167 would be eligible f()r a scholarship under the Act,
but his children would not. 16 X This type of discriminatory
classification-classification based on the national origin of one's
scrutinv "169 t-cc1uiring the
b
lxlrcnts-is subJ.CCt to "the most ri<rid
applicuion of strict scrutiny.170
.i

')

L

D. Strict ScrutJi~l' Appjjcation
The next step in the equal protection analysis is to determine
what level of scrutiny to apply: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
or rational basis review. Given the varying ditlicultics of the
government in overcoming the analysis, the level of scrutiny is
crucial, with strict scrutiny being the toughcst.17 1 While an Equal
Protection Clause claim can be brought under either classification
pursuant to this analysis-alienage or national origin-the
appropriate test is the same regardless. I 72 The Supreme Court in the
Ci(l' o{ Clcbumc, Tex;Is v. Cleburne Living Center grouped
classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin together
because
It Ihcsc f:Ktors arc so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations arc
deemed to rdkct prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the
burdened class arc not as worthy or deserving as others. For these
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikclv to be soon

166. !d. .lt 2 I 7.
167. WF:--JDY S. WILS0:--1 & (;FRALll H. HEIC'v!At\, CRITIC\! Tlllt\KINlo l!SINl;
I'RIMi\RY SoURCES 1:--1 U.S. HISTORY HO (2000). Korenutsu was born in the United States,
hut his parents immigrated to the United Stcrtcs ti·om Japan. !d. His witC Katlwrn Korcmatsu
was born in South C1rolina. SA:\ LEANDRO MA YORi\L !'ROU .i\i'v!ATION: KATIIR Y:--1
KoREMi\TSU
DAY
(Mar.
I 4,
20 I 2 ),
:w.ubhlc
:zt
http:/fwww .san lea nd n >.< >rg/dcpts/cityha11/cc nmci 1/comnKndati< ms _proclanuti< ms _and_ ceremo
nicll_tTsolutions.asp (illustrolting that even if the Koremcltsu's child met the other requirements,
she would still be ineligible ti>r the scholarship because neither of her parents arc immigrants).
16H. I 10 ILL. COM I'. STAT.'>47/67(c) (201 I) (requiring recipients to luvc .l\l immigrclllt
pcHTnt).
16'>. Koremarw, 323 U.S. at 216.
170. ld
I 71 . c;crald ( ;unthcr, 1l1e Supreme Court, I 'J7! Term-Foreword: In Sc:mh oF
F1·o!t·in!{ /)ocrn/Je on :z ChzngtiJg Cf111rt: A ,Hodel fiw :1 Newer f:(ju:zf!'mtcction, H6 I IAR \'. I ..
RF\'. I, H ( 1'>72) (stating that strict scrutiny is "strict in thcorv and btal in fKt").
172. Citv of Cleburne, Tex. \'. Clcbttmc Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (I <JH5 ).
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rectified by legislative means, these laws arc subject to strict
scrutiny ... _173
As such, strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest
f(:>r the classification, and the implementation of the classification
must be narrowly tailored to meet th~lt intcrcst.I74
Aside from the justification of the view set f(xth in the Ci~v oF
Cleburne, Texas, the Court has stated that alienage, race, and
national origin should further be protected because, in addition to
not being reflective of their "ability to contribute to socicty," 17S these
classifications arc "characteristic! s I determined by causes not within
the control of the 1 individual! .... "!76 furthermore, the
Constitution will not allow these classifications, either, which is why
the Act must be struck down under equal protection f(>r punishing
children based on characteristics of their parcnts. 177
While this statute may appear to be "beneficial" discrimination by
aiding minorities, the Supreme Court has already addressed this
theory.' n Ultimately it has been decided that
It !he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only
because those classifications can harm hvorcd races or arc based on
illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government
places citizens on racial registers and makes race rclev~1nt to the
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us <111. 179
Therd()re, strict scrutiny applies regardless of how beneficial this
discriminatory statute is considcrcd.l80 The Courts have, however,
recently articulated that the majority party would not pass legislation
to their own detriment unless they deemed it satisf:Ktory. 181 This

173.

!d.

174.
17S.
176.
177.

!d.

Mathews v. Luus, 427 U.S. 495, 505 ( 1976 ).
ld
.kc Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("/ W Je lu\T im·.1lidated cl.lssitiutions
that burden illegitimate children f(lr the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents").
178. Regents of Univ. of (:ali f. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978) (stating that strict
scrutiny applied even if the discrimination was being used to aid minorities).
179. Sec Parents Involved in Cmrv. Schs. v. Se.lttlc Sch. J)ist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701, 7S2
(2007) (pointing out that discrimination, even if bendicial to one race, burdens another) . .~(·c
.lim W\·gant \'. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) ("The Court has recognized tlut
the level of scrutiny does not change merely beuuse the challenged classitiution operates
against a group that historically Ius not been subject to governmcnul discrimination.").
I 80. l'armt' !ni'OI!nf, SS I U.S. at 752 (2007).
181. John Hart Elv, The Constitlltionalin·oFR.cvcJ:\·c R.aci;i/ J)i,crimination, 41 U. CIII.
. Rn·. 723, 73S (1974).
.~(:c
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argument bils to take into consideration other reasons that may exist
f(>r passing legislation, such as pandering to certain groups f(>r
votcs. 1~ 2 While strict scrutiny has been rdcrrcd to as "strict in thcorv,
but htal in hct,"i~3 an ,111:1lysis of the test must still be done to
determine if the state has a compelling interest that is narrowh·
tailorcd. 1~' 4
1. Compci!Iizg IiltLTcst
The state docs not have a compelling interest in establishing the
DREAM schobrship program b,1scd on a suspect classification. The
otlcrcd intent of the act is to "help Ithe applicants' I f1milics and
maybe be the first person that's gone to colkgc."IX5 few compelling
interests exist to justif)r legislation that utilizes suspect
classifications.' X6 That said, courts have recognized compelling
interests in the past: I~' 7 first, to remedy past discrimination lXX and
second, to provide a diversity of perspectives within cducation. 1X0
Unf(>rtunatdy, neither of these interests is prcscnt within this Act.
While this statute creates a scholarship f(>r students to aid them in
funding their education, ' 00 merely being related to education docs
not make the Act sufficient to meet the compelling interest of
diversity of perspectives in education t(mnd in Cruttcr v.
Ho!!Iizgcr.I 01 Gruttcr addressed a university's practice of considering
<111 applicant's race in admissions as one t:Ktor to encourage diversity

I X2. !d (illustrating other reasons t(Jr p.lssing this tvpc of legislation, such as garnering
support ti·om a particular segment of the population).
IX3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pcna, SIS U.S. 200, 275 (1<)<)5) (Ginsburg, J.,
di~scnting).
1~4.
S(·c Grnrtcr v. Bollinger, 53<) U.S . .306 (200.3) (overcoming a strict scrutinv
.lluh·sis).
IXS . .~(·c II.R. 0060, <)3d Gen. Asscmb. lXI
(Ill. 200.3), ;w;u/ahlc ;Jr
http: I/www. i Ig;l. g< lV /kgislatioll/bi llstatus,;lsp? n, JCN lll11 =
0060&(;1\J I )=3&GA=03& I )ocTvpcJJ)= J-IB&I.cgll )=I %&Session II )=3&SpecScss=.
I X6. AdJr;md C'onsrrucron, 51 S U.S. at 27S (emphasizing th.lt strict scrlltinv is "btal" in
bet bccmsc it is supposed to weed out kgitimatl' uses ti·om illegitimate uses whm Elced wirh a
suspect classiticnion).
I X7. !d.
!XX . .~(·c Local 2X of Sheet Metal Workers' lnt'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 47X U.S. 421, 47<)
(I <)X(J J (;lHirming the usc of ;l remedy tilt· p;lst discrimi1ution as a valid interest).
I X0. Ad1ond Crmsrrucron, 515 U.S. 200.
]00. 110 ILL. COM!'. STSI. <)47/67(c) (2011 ).
101. (;ruttcr v. Bolling<'r, 53<) U.S. 306, 32X (2003) (indicating; tlut policies will still be
scrutinized l'\Tn though thev ;llldress educatio11.ll bendirs).

196

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2013

in its law schooi. 1lJ2 Unlike GruttcJ~ this Act docs not ~1ssurc diversity
in an educational institution. The applicants could go to a school that
is already diverse or not provide diversity at all, as eligibility is based
on the parents' and not the applicant's status. furthermore, ~1nd
most importantly, "race and national origin Ican be considered I,
but . . . cannot Ibe used to I . . . render a judgment solely on that
basis," as is the case here, leaving the Act without a compelling
intercst.19 3
Aside from diversity at an educational instih1tion, the Court has
f(mnd programs that rectify past discrimination against suspect
classes to be a compelling interest. 194 Illinois State Representative
Eddie Acevedo stated, "This is going to be a ftmd that's going to be
available not only to undocumented immigrants but to all
immigrants here in Illinois." 195 However, there is no evidence that
this segment of the population has been discriminated against in
tlmding. 196 In f:1ct, some of the senators and representatives
themselves may potentially be eligible f(>r the scholarship, having
immigrant parents. 197 Thercf(>re, a scenario of discrimination against
immigrant populations must have existed in Illinois in order to pass
legislation to remedy that past discrimination.19X

192. !d..lt 339.
193. Nc!hlw, ,.. Ridge, 2003 WL 22X49146, Jt *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. I, 2003).
194. Local 2X of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 47X U.S. 421, 479 (I 9X6 J.
I95. Clurlcs Thomas, Quinn 5/"gns 1/!Jiu>il Urc;~m Acr, ABC 7 NFWS (Aug. I, 20 II),
http:/ jabclocal.go.com/wls/storv1section = news/lool& id = X2X I X2 7.
196. Sec H.R. 0060, 93d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003 ), ;11",/1/;zh/c H
http:/ jwww. ilga.g<>\'/lcgislation/hillstattls.asp? D<>eN 11111 =0060&GAI I)= 3&GA =93& I)<>cTvpe
ID=HB&Leg!D= I95&Session!D=3&SpecScss= (granting in-state tuition to non-citizcm. if
they "graduated ti-om a high 'chool in IIllinois 1. among other conditions.") . .~(·c ;~/m Chi. Pub.
Sch,. Coil. & Career Preparation, Undocumented Swdcnt1, Section 7- Sdw!:znhip1 fi>r
Undowmmtcd
Swdcnt1;
CHOOSE
YOUR
HJTURE,
iltt[l ://W\\'W .ell<" >Sev<Hirtilture. org/c<>llcge/UIKi<KtlmCilted-sttldcllt' #sch< >Iarsh i11 ( lclst vi.sited
Ike. 25, 2012) (indicating rhat "It !here Jre IalreJdv I scholarships avJilablc till· undocumented
students through private organizations," as well as scholarships that do not usc immigr.lnt
statm as criteria ti>r eligibility).
197. .kc S. l'LOOR DEBATE, supt;z note 117, at 26 (quoting Senator T. )ohm.on stating
thc1t "the children of 111\' grandparents had no choice hut to come with their parents to this
countrv," indicating that his parents immigrated to the United States, and, thcrdiHT, if he mer
the other recjuiremcnts, he would be eligible l(,r the DREAM 'cholarship).
19X. Sec Fou/28, 47X U.S. 421.
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Additionally, while the Court in I<orcmatsu did find th~lt a
compelling interest existed in detaining those with Japanese ancestry,
the interest was predicated on the bet that the United States was at
war with Japan, 1<J<J and there arc presently no wars against
immigrants to justif~· such a classification.200 ~urthcrmorc, Congress
decided that "the decision in Korcmatm lies overruled in the court of
history,"201 significantly limiting the weight a compelling interest
stemming from I<orcmatm could be given.

2. Narrowk tailored
The Supreme Court requires that suspect cbssifications with a
compelling interest must be narrowly tailored in order to limit the
effects of the discrimination. 202 Thcrd(:n-e, even should a compelling
state interest be f(nmd in the case of the Illinois DREAM Act, the
statute as written is not n~1rrowly tailored to meet such an interest. If
the interest is grounded in making education more avaibble to
citizens who would otherwise be unable to attend college, it f1ils to
do so in a narrowly tailored manner, as the statute's wording allows
individuals who sutter no financial hardships or burdens to apply f(>r
the schobrship. 2m Allowing wealthy students or those with college
expenses paid through other means to take advantage of the
schobrship may deprive those whose only prohibition is cost of a
scholarship opportunity. 204 ~urthermorc, economic h~1rdships do
not distinguish based on national origin, race, or alienage. These
hardships atHict all segments of the population, and if the state's
interest W~lS to make education more aft(n·dabJc to its citizens, nonfinancial-based classifications curtail that goal. 20 5 Instead, the Act is
I<J<J. Korcnutsu v. Unitl'd Statl's, 323li.S. 214 (I<J44).
200 .~(·c td (dl'cickd as a compl'lling intnl'st because till' Unitl'd St.ltl'S \L\S at w,lr with
).1pan ,md )apanl'se individtul' werl' trl'atnl ditrcrl'ntlv. Thi' cbssitic1tion, hown-cr, dol's not
trl',lt ditkrl'ntlv Iraqis or anv othn group with which thl' Unitl'd Statl's is ,\t war; f(>r a
compelling intl'ITst to exist in this ca,e, thl' Unitl'd Sratl's would have to be involved in a war
on immigration).
20 l. S. Res. 126, I 09th Cong., 151 CoNci. RH. 7954 (Apr. 21, 2005 ).
202. .~(·c Wvg.mt v. ),lckson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 265, 2lB (I<JX6) (stating that a
narrowlv tailored tit needs to bl' "less intrusive").
203. 110 II.!.. COM!'. STAT. 947/67 (2011) (noting no financial hardship requirements).
204. !d. (assuming a 'ceiurio whne because tinanci,ll lurdship is not ,\ll inquirv, ,\ll
indiv·idtul tliilv capable of paying f(Jr college receive» the schobrship o\'l'r someone who em not
aH<>rd college).
20S. Sec The Henrv ). Kaiser Familv Found., !'twcm· Rate lw R.Iu/Fthnicin·, St:Itc.1
( ](}(Jl).2(} I 0),
U.S.
(20 I 0},
ST.\ IT.H l·o\I.TIIFM TS.ORli,

198

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

tailored t()r immigrants and gives no attention to making higher
education more available to the economically deprived-immigrant
or not. 206
At the same time, the Act is also overly broad, providing
superfluous assistance to some individuals ~1nd not others who arc
similarly situatcd. 207 Prior to the statute, the state already had
financial aid assistance programs in place t()r citizens, as well as
reduced tuition rates at public universities to make college more
aft(H·dable.20X following the public act creating this statute, those
same assistance programs were made available to immigrant students
who tiled t()r a taxpayer identification numbcr. 20'> By allowing
everyone within the state regardless of alienage or national origin
access to the same financial assistance t()r higher education, the state
was not and is not creating any classification. It is the portion of the
Act mandating that a scholarship be payable to certain individuals
distinguishable on the basis of national origin and alienage that
creates the problem. Thus, opening tlmding puts everyone on equal
f()oting, rendering creation of the scholarship a separate and
unnecessary action not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest.
If the state is successful in articulating that the interest it purports
to establish is fcmnd in educational divcrsity2IO even though the state
is not an educational institution,211 the Act would still likely not be
narrowly tailored. first, the Act docs not require applicants to attend
universities with an underrepresented group of students whose
parents arc immigrants; thus, there is no assurance of crc~lting the
14&cat= I (last visited Feb. 4, 2012)
(illustrating tlut the distribmion ofpovcrtv in the United States is 14'){, white, 36% black, 35%
Hispanic, cllld 23% percent l(>r othn).
206. 110 ILL. COM I'. STAT. '>47/67 (2011 ).
207. !d. 305j7e-5 (2011) . .~{·c;z/m IS ILL. Co.\11'. STAT. 505/16.5 (201 1).
20X. H.R.
0060, '>3d
Gen.
Assemh.
(Ill.
2003),
;w;ulzbk
at
http:/ jwww .ilga.g< >v/lcgislati<m/billstatus.asp~ J)ocN um =
0060&CAID=3&CA ='>3&DocTypdD=l IB& Ixgm= I<>S&Session!D= 3&SpccSess=.
20'>. II 0 ITT.. COM I'. STAT. 305/7c-5 (20 II) (making in-state tuition available to
citizens, residents, and non-residents who submit an attidavit stating an intent to become .1
permanent resident '\lt the earliest opportunity the individual is eligible to do so.").
210. Sec (;ruttcr v. Bollinger, 53'> U.S. 306 (2003) (articulating thclt educational
divcrsitv is cl compelling interest).
211. ,kc I I. R. 0060, '>3d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003 ), ;w;ulzbk at
http:/fwww. ilga.gov/lcgislation/billstatus.asp? I)<>eN um =
0060&GAI 1)=3&C.;A='>3& J)ocTypell )= HB&I .egll )=I <>S&Sessionll)= 3&SpecSess =
(noting that the Act serves to modi!\• the operating of public universities, illustrating how the
sute itself is not ell\ educational institution).
http://W\\W.stcltehealthf:Kts.org/compardxu·.jsp~ind=
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diverse arrav of views in which the state takes an intcrcst. 212 Nor is
the state in the best position to create diverse educational settings, ~1s
universities determine admissions and arc most knowledgeable ~1bout
the diversity of their student bodies. Additionally, the same day
Gruttcr was decided to allow educational diversity as a compelling
interest, the Court ruled on the attempt in Grat:z v. Bollingcr to apply
that interest. 213 In G1:zt:z, the interest was deemed to not be narrowly
tailored because the admissions program gave so much weight to
race that it became the deciding bctor in admitting studcnts.214 The
ditlcrcncc between Gl:zt:z and Gruttcr as the Court articulated it is
that seeking to achieve diversity in the educational setting is tine, but
race cannot overshadow other qualifications. 215 Like in Gnzt:z, the
Illinois DREAM Act uses a suspect classification as the determining
hctor f(>r eligibility and hils to be narrowly tailored to achieve any
alleged diversity goal. furthermore, in (,'ruttCI; the Court
emphasized the need to treat people as individuals21 6 and not just as
members of groups.217 While this Act purports to be selecting
individual applicants, it docs so only after preventing other groups
from applying, again making it br from narrowly tailored. 21 X
Likewise, the Act will not succeed in an argument of remedying
past discrimination. The Act is <>Vcr-inclusivc, allowing children who
arc immigr~lnts thcmsclvcs, 21 'J undocumented alicns, 220 and United
States citizens to apply, 221 while also leaving open the possibility f(>r
any one of these to be ultimately incligible.222 Thcrd(>rc, the statute
c1nnot be narrowly tailored in remedying past discrimination when
212. 110 ILL. CO.~! I'. STAT. 'J47/67 (2011) (noting no university stipulation attached to
scholarship guidclin<"s).
213. <..;rat£ v. Bollingn, S3'J U.S. 244, 26X (2003).
214. !d. .lt 246.
215. !d
216. Sec Gruttn v. Bollint>;n, 53<) U.S. 306, at 334 (2003) (emphasi£int>; the need l(>r
individual review instead of grouping).
217. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. \'.Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, SSI U.S. 701, 743
(2007).
21X. 110 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 'J47/67(c) (2011).
21 Y. !d. (allowing someone who was horn ;!broad hut movl'd her<' with a parent to he
eligible).
220. !d. (allowing someone who was horn ;lbnud hut moved here illegallv with a parent
to he eligible).
221. !d. (allowing someone who was horn hne afi:n parents .1lreadv immigrated hnc to
he clit>;ihlc).
222. !d. (nuking someone ineligible tf their parents did not immigrate to the United
St.ltes, l'\Tll if thcv bll into one of the other three cncgorics).

200

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

r2o13

members of the group f(mncrly discriminated against arc both
included and potentially excluded at the same time under the
application of the remedying law.223

IV. CONCLUSION
As identified in this Note, to establish a viobtion of the Equal
Protection Clause, the first requirement is that some fcm11 of "state
action" exists. 224 Illinois' Public Act 097-0233 is by definition and in
its nature an Act passed by the process of bicameralism and
presentment and, thcrdc:>rc, constitutes "state action. " 225 The Illinois
Scmte proposed and approved Senate Bill 2185, 226 the Illinois
House of Representatives approved the bill, 22 7 and the Governor of
Illinois signed it into law. 22 X These acts-proposing, approving,
enacting, and eventually enforcing-<lrc direct actions taken by the
state and thus "state action" f(>r purposes of an equal protection
analysis.
The state meets the second requirement by creating a
classification by drawing distinctions along class lines in the wording
of the statute. The classification created is one established under
alienage or national origin,229 which arc suspect classifications
requiring the application of the strict scrutiny test. 23° The stahltc,
E1lling short of meeting a compelling state interest or being narrowly
tailored to achieve any such interest if one did exist, E1ils the strict
scrutinv test. 231

223. ld (noting thar bcc1usc the Acr docs not address rhc individual .1pplving, similar
pcopk in similar .situations will be treated ditkrcntlv based on their parents' statuses).
224. Recent lkvdopmcnts, Sllf"" note 2S, at 1237.
22S. Illinois DREAM Act, Pub. Act No. 97-233 (20 II).
226. H.R.
21X5,
97th
Gen.
Asscmb.
(Ill.
2011 ),
;w.ul;~h/c
;It
http://www.ilgcLgov/kgislation/Bii!Sratus.asp?DocNum=21XS&(;A[J)= I I &J)c>eTvpcll)= SB
&Scssionll)=X4&GA=97.
227. Jd
22X. ld
229. Supm Part lll.C.
230. ld
231. Supr.1 l'.lrt ll .D.
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While compelling interests have been t(mnd in suspect
classifications in the past under equal protection an~1!yscs,232 this docs
not give a legislative body or government free rci<rn
to blindlv,.,·
b
"discriminate on the basis of race" to achieve a "worthy goal." 2 "" The
statute draws from "immutable characteristics determined solclv hv
the accident of birth " 2 34-charactcristics beyond personal contn;l. 1;1
bet, the Supreme Court in P{vlcr v. Doc articulated the exact
sittution this Act creates: "children who arc plaintitls in these cases
'can atkct neither their parents' conduct nor their own st~ltus."' 2 35
The children eligible f(ll· the DREAM Act scholarship arc just like the
children ineligible f(>r this scholarship; to treat them ditlcrcntly docs
them an injustice bcf(m: their journey into higher education even
begins. Public Act 97-233 needs to be repealed bd(>l-c it is t(nmd
unconstitutional f(>r violating the fourteenth Amendment. Allowing
it to continue wastes resources as well as time of both the state and
the individual applicants whose ctl<>rts will be f(>r naught once the
statute is deemed unconstitutional. 23 6
The Illinois DREAM Act has implications outside of Illinois and
the United States Constitution, too. When legislative acts like this arc
executed on unstable f(nmdations, they give Elise hope and security
to the people who rely on thcm.237 Student applicants, who arc
potentially undocumented immigrants, run the severe risk of being
ousted after revealing their alien status, feeling that programs like this
arc aimed to help thcm.23X While it may be true that such laws arc
being created to aid undocumented students, their legal sutuscs
cannot be modified or changed by the state, 239 as adjustment of legal
C

232.
233.

(2007).
234.
235.
236.

L

•·

L

Sec Grurtcr v. Bollinger, 53<) lJ .S. 306 (2003) (overcoming strict scrutinv analysis).
l'cm.'nts Involved in Cmtv. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 70 I, 743

Fronticro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 6X6 (1973).
l'lykr v. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (I 'JX2 ).
Appointmcnn·, supr:z note 95 (the more time the stclte continues on this endeavor,
the more moncv it will spend on it, in addition to whcltevcr mew happen to the recipients when
this is deemed unconstitutional).
237. .~(·c f';z.;sing the J)JU:'A}vf Act, Sllf'J:J note I 0 ( postings bv individuals who cl!T
t-eh·ing on the Federal DREAM Act).
23X. Jd (postings on Senator Durbin's website include names. Additionallv, bccntse the
Illinois DREAM hmd Commission is operated in part through ISAC, it mew he subject to
Freedom of Int<>rmation Act requests, potentially making applicants' immigration sutuses
known to the public).
239. .kc DIFTZ FT AI.., supr;z note I 0.
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status requires federal action. 240 Thus, state programs arc creating
potentially troubling situations2 41 with little to gain when the
programs arc based on unconstitutional grounds.
Other states already implementing or considering simibr
legislation 242 should consider this analysis, as it may also apply to
their acts. Given the importance of these bills to the individuals being
assisted, ensuring their constitutionality and ability to be upheld is of
the utmost importance. 243 One individual is believed to have taken
his lite because he believed he could no longer pursue his dream after
a version of the federal DREAM Act E1iled to pass.244 While state
acts serve significantly diflercnt goals than the proposed federal Act
and the previous example is likely extreme, the emotions that
surround the state bills arc still very important to potentially affected
individuals. 245 Illinois and any state considering this type of
legislation should remedy constitutional violations prior to giving
t:1lsc hope or awarding monies to individuals. This will prevent other
individuals from experiencing similar letdowns and tragedy when
such acts arc t<:mnd unconstitutionaJ.246
This Act's fatal flaw is the state's participation; without that
participation, the Act is not subject to an equal protection analysis. 247
The Illinois legislators adamant about aiding the sihlation of
immigrant and undocumented children alikc24X have taken the first
step by making already-existing higher education tlmding available to

240. !d.
241. Sec f'.IS.\JliJ.; the J)JUoALH Act; supm note 10.
242. .~<x Aswini Anburajan, Sratc-/w-Statc !'ush fi>r a /)rc;Jm Act, T!!E Atv!ER!C\J'.:
l'ROSI'F< :T (Mar. 2X, 20 II), http://prospect.orwJrticlr/sUte-statr-push-drc.lm-clCt (stating that
several sutes, such as Marvland, New York, and Calit(mJia, have passed or have pending
"Dream Act-like bills").
243. Sec f'.ISSJlli!; the J)RJ,A;H Act, supu note 10. Sec aim Ill. Coalition f(>r Immigranr
& R.di1gee Rights, lhv Rdin·c JJJU:A;H ~"ore Swdcin\ ?:ilk Ahout DRloA1H Act & Suiudc
(Ike. 7, 20 I 0), http:/jicirr.orgjes/conrent/day-drcam-v<>te-students-talk-about-dream-actsuicide.
244. Rrvan Llenas, f:umk Sw1<!1 lw C/;uin t!ut Tcm Killed Hiinsc/FOJn·JJRf.>tH Act,
Fox
NEWS
LATIJ'.:O
(Dec.
5,
2011),
http://Iatino. I( 1x news .o >m/lati 11< >/news/20 I I/ 12/0 5/su icide-lcttcr-o mlirms-teen-killed -hi msel t~
<l\'er-dream-act-bm ily-sa vs/.
245. Sec l'.~.>sJl~f!; the J)RloA/''1 Act, sup1:1 note I 0.
246. .S<-c IJcnc1s, supra note 244.
247. Recent lkvclopments, supr;lnote 25, at 123X.
24X . .kc H.R. 21X5, 97th (;en. Assemb. 20 (Ill. 2011), ;Jl'.llld>lc .It
hrrp://www.ilga.gov/lcgislation/Bii!Starus.asp? DocNum=21 H5&GAI D= II &DocTvpdl )= SB
&SessionlD=X4&GA=<J7; H.R. FlOOR DFBATE, sup1:1 nore 122, at 179.
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all Illinois citizens. 24<J The scholarship portion of the Act-the only
portion violating equal protection-should be severed from the Act,
and the same legislators should f(mn a private organization, privately
run and privately funded, to provide DREAM scholarships. Giwn
that the existing scholarship is alrc1dy "privately funded,"2SO the
org~mization would be in the same position for ~lLqmnng
contributions, and, because the organization would be priv,ltc, it
could be established in a relatively short period of time. 251
Additiotully, state universities ~1re in a better position to
administer scholarships to undocumented or immigrant children.
The interests laid out in Gruttcr establish that a university "has a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body," and
thcrd(>re is the proper ~wemte to implement such scholarships.25 2
While a university cannot implement the same program as the one
enacted by the st~ue, it can begin taking into consideration
undocumented or immigrant statuses of individuals and potenti~1lly
otkr these students scholarships to entice them to come to a
particular university in order to encourage diverse viewpoints in the
educational setting. 25"
By enacting progr~1ms that aft(>rd assistance to immigLmt and
undocumented students, the state is providing a positive message on
how the state sees and values such individuals. 254 Hovvevcr, enacting
unconstitutional legislation to tltrther that view serves no one, no
matter how strong the desire to promote it. The portion of this Act
that puts cvc1:vonc in the state on equal f(>oting is a commendable
eH<>rt, and the state should not let that progress be overshadowed by
the unconstitutional portions of the Act. Instead, Public Act 97-233,

24<J. 110 l!.I.. COM!'. STAT. "0Sj7e-S (201 I) (making in-state tuition available to
citi1.em, residents, ,md non-residents who stthmit '\11 aflidavit suting an intent to become 'l
pcrmanem residem "at the earliest opportunitY the individu,ll is eligible to do so.").
2SO. .~(·c AJ>pointmcnn·, supu note <JS.
2S 1. However, the old organiz,ltion should not be transtl:rred outright to the pri\\lte
org.mization, as there m,l\' still he state action. 5(·c Evans v. Newton, "X2 U.S. 2<)6, "OI
(I <J66) ("[ VV [e em not take judicial notice th,u the mere substitution of trustees instantly
rr,mskrred this park ti·om the public to the private sector.").
252. Crutter v. Bollinger, 53<) US 306, 30<) (2003).
253. Jd
254. .~(-c Grwcrnor Quinn Sit{nS 1/!tiwil J)JU:JIA1 Act, ILI.INOIS c;ovi:R:-.JMFNT NFWS
NETWORK
(Aug.
I,
2011 ),
http :jjwww. ill in< >is.g< >v/prcssrcleases/Sh,,wPress RcJc,\sc .din) Subject! I)= 2& Rec Num =<J5X7
(quoting Senator Cullcrron: "lmmigr.lllts arc a driving t(>rce in our citv's ndtttr,ll ,md economic
lik," emphasizing the value Illinois pbces on its immigr.lllt popuLltion).
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creating the Illinois DREAM fund Commission, should be repealed
by the state bd()re being repealed in the courts.

Wilkun Wojn;Jrmvsk?

* William Wojnarowski is a third-ve,lr law studem at Northern Illinois Univnsitv College of
Law. While he is not eligible t<>r the scholarship outlined in this Act, both his girltrimd and
brher arc, initiallv making him question the consriturionalirv of the Act. He would like to
thank his fll11ilv ,llld girlti·iend f(>r their love and support, as well as his mmtor lknurdo
[s,Kovici, whom he has worked with to deknd individuals in deportation removal proceedings.
Mr. vVojnarowski would like to sec a constitution,!! resolution to immigrc1tion rdim11.

